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Abstract 
European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to 
fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the 
autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted 
by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court 
of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures 
affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to 
fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law.  
While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left 
unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of 
European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann 
to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European 
Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, 
namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions 
imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, appendix and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 7492 words. 
Subjects and topics 
European Union citizenship 
Nationality 
Fundamental principles of European Union law 
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I  Introduction - Citizenship and the European Union 
European Union (EU) citizenship was established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 
1992.1 It has since been amended and extended, and is now incorporated into Article 20(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides:2 
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of 
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship. 
While citizenship as a concept has been subject to a variety of interpretations and 
understandings, the fundamental conceptual elements are clear: citizenship denotes the 
relationship between an individual and a body of politics.3 Following Greek democratic 
thought, the rights of citizens were established by the constitution and protected through 
various institutions created by the polis, establishing a political regime in which all who were 
citizens had full and equal membership.4 In its modern the rights attaching to citizenship are 
established and protected through the nation-state - of which the EU is neither nation nor 
state. 
The formation of the nation-state saw a sovereign political body establish authority over the 
people residing within its boundaries as legitimate subjects of the state, while the 
socialisation of the masses and the promotion of common values created bonds between the 
people of the state and between them and the state.5 As a result, individuals came to consider 
themselves as a people; individuals with a shared national identity established under the 
nation-state. EU citizenship confers political and legal status on these individuals beyond the 
state; a transnational citizenship which is inextricably linked with their possession of 
nationality. It is for this reason that while EU citizenship is "destined to be the fundamental 
                                                            
1 Treaty on European Union [1992] 35 OJ C 191/01 (7 February 1992), Art 8(1). 
2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] 55 OJ C 326/49 (13 
December 2007). 
3 Lyn Dobson Supranational Citizenship (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2006) at 20. 
4 Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw "Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship" 
in Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw (eds) Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a 
Transnational Context (Palgrave MacMillan Ltd, Hampshire, 2006) 1 at 3. 
5 At 4. 
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status of nationals of the Member States",6 Art 20(1) makes it clear that Union citizenship is 
dependent upon nationality of a Member State (MS). 
As provided for in the Declaration on Nationality of a Member State appended to the TEU, 
matters relating to nationality fall within the exclusive prerogative of each MS:7 
…wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference is 
made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual 
possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference 
to the national law of the Member State concerned. 
As noted by Advocate-General Maduro in his Opinion to the Court in Rottmann, with 
nationality the State defines its people, therefore it is highly logical that the State determines 
who its nationals are.8 However, Maduro goes on to note that the competence of the MS is 
not without restrictions. Union citizenship creates a political area from which rights and 
obligations independent of the MS are established.9 While possession of MS nationality is a 
precondition for accessing Union citizenship, the rights and obligations conferred by Union 
citizenship cannot be unjustifiably limited.10 Thus, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 
landmark decision in Micheletti held that while matters relating to nationality fall within the 
exclusive prerogative of each MS, the conditions for nationality must be determined "having 
due regard to Community law".11 This imposes a restriction on the competence of each MS, 
having since been interpreted to mean, that where the issue is a situation which falls within 
the scope ratione materiae of EU law, due regard must be had to EU law.12 
The ECJ in Rottmann had the opportunity to discuss and clarify what it means to have "due 
regard" to EU law. In so doing, the Court transformed the law on citizenship by holding that 
measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the EU fall within the 
scope ratione materiae of EU law and are therefore amenable to review by the ECJ. This 
requires MSs to observe fundamental principles of EU law when imposing measures relating 
                                                            
6 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 at 
para 31. 
7 Declaration No 2 on Nationality of a Member State appended to the Treaty on European Union, above n 1. 
8 Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro, Case C-135/08 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-2449, at 
para 17. 
9 At para 23. 
10 At para 23. 
11 Case C-369/90 Micheletti v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239 at [10]. 
12 See, eg, Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] ECR I-2629 at para 15; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v 
Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613 at para 23; Rottmann, above n 8, at para 41. 
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to the deprivation of nationality and, consequently, Union citizenship, to ensure that the 
measures comply with EU law.  
II  The Rottmann Judgment 
A Factual Background 
Janko Rottmann was an Austrian national who had lost his nationality upon acquiring 
German nationality by naturalisation. He failed to inform the German authorities of criminal 
proceedings filed against him in Austria, and a decision to revoke his citizenship was made 
on the grounds of deception. The revocation of his citizenship would not only have taken 
away his German nationality but it would also have deprived him of his Union citizenship. A 
preliminary hearing by the ECJ was sought to determine whether it is contrary to EU law for 
a MS to withdraw from a citizen the nationality acquired by deception inasmuch as the 
withdrawal deprives the person of their status of citizen of the Union and the benefit of the 
rights attaching thereto.  
B Issues 
The first issue for the Court was whether the situation fell within the scope ratione materiae 
of EU law. Satisfied, the Court held that "it is clear" that the situation of a citizen who is 
faced with a decision revoking his nationality which would put him in a position capable of 
causing him to lose his EU citizenship and the rights attaching thereto, falls "by reason of its 
nature and its consequences" within the ambit of EU law.13 Citizenship of the Union is 
intended to be the fundamental status of all nationals of MSs and the provisions relating to 
Union citizenship attaches to that status rights and duties, therefore when exercising their 
powers in the sphere of nationality MSs must have due regard to EU law.14 
Finding that "by reason of its nature and its consequences" the withdrawal of national 
citizenship fell within the ambit of EU law, the ECJ went on to hold:15 
The proviso that due regard must be had to European Union law… enshrines 
the principle that, in respect of citizens of the Union, the exercise of that 
power [to determine matters of nationality], in so far as it affects the rights 
                                                            
13Rottmann, above n 8, at para 42. 
14 At paras 43-45. 
15 At para 48. 
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conferred and protected by the legal order of the Union…is amenable to 
judicial review carried out in the light of European Union law. 
As Rottmann had enjoyed the status and the rights conferred by Union citizenship, a decision 
to revoke his Union citizenship would undeniably affect the enjoyment of those rights.16 
The Court went on to hold that it is for the national court to conduct the review in the light of 
EU law.17 This review must ascertain whether the withdrawal decision observes the principle 
of proportionality - a fundamental principle of EU law.18 However, in theory, any principle of 
EU law may be applied when determining due regard.19 
C Where to from here? 
Although the ECJ held that the deprivation of Union citizenship fell within the scope ratione 
materiae of EU law, the ECJ left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of 
nationality also falls within the scope of EU law and thus whether the measures imposed 
when granting nationality must also have due regard to EU law. The importance of 
addressing this question has become evident with the establishment of investment 
programmes offered by MSs. Such programmes could allow for mass naturalisation of 
individuals who can "buy" Union citizenship, which may have the potential to negatively 
affect another MS and the rights protected by the EU. 
The remainder of this paper shall analyse the law post-Rottmann to determine whether the 
acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of EU law. It shall then analyse whether 
the principle of proportionality could be applied in order to regulate the measures imposed by 
MSs in relation to the acquisition of nationality, with specific reference to Malta's Individual 
Investor Programme. 
 
 
                                                            
16 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 49. 
17 At para 55. 
18 At para 55. 
19 Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro, Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, above n 8, at para 28. In theory, "any 
rule of the Community legal order may be invoked if the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality 
laid down by a Member State are incompatible with it". 
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III  Acquisition of Nationality - A Situation Which Falls Within the Scope 
 Ratione Materiae of EU law? 
The statement made by the ECJ in Rottmann that the issue of deprivation of Union 
citizenship fell within the scope of EU law "by reason of its nature and consequences" is 
seemingly broad in its ordinary language; however the reasoning of the Court provides two 
interpretations for this statement. First, where the situation affects the rights conferred and 
protected by EU law, due regard must be had to EU law. Second, by virtue of the 
fundamental nature of the rights attached to Union citizenship, citizenship as a concept falls 
in its entirety within the scope of EU law. 
Upon the face of it, the acquisition of nationality could fall within either approach. However, 
it has consistently been held that the application of EU law does not extend to matters of 
citizenship which otherwise have no link to situations governed by the EU.20 Such matters are 
"internal situations" and fall within the competence of the MS. Consequently, an individual 
must exercise one of their fundamental rights conferred by the EU in order for the situation to 
fall within the ambit of EU law, in particular, the right to freedom of movement.21 Following 
this traditional approach, the acquisition of MS nationality could not fall within the ambit of 
EU law as it does not involve a cross-border element, thus it would be a purely internal 
situation. 
In recent years, however, the ECJ seems to have changed its focus. Culminating in the 
decision in Rottmann which failed to mention internal situations, the focus seems to have 
embraced a wider rights-orientated approach. While the restriction still remains, it is arguable 
that the hurdle of internal situations is slowly beginning to diminish. Should this be the case, 
the argument that the acquisition of nationality is a situation which falls within the scope of 
EU law takes much stronger effect. 
 
 
 
                                                            
20 See Kremzow, above n 12, at para 15; Joined Cases C-64/96 and 65/96 Uecker and Jacquet v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3171 at para 16. 
21 Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] ECR I-6241 at paras 73 and 77; Garcia Avello, above n 12, at para 
24. 
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A Internal Situations: Diminished Effect or an Effective Hurdle? 
While Metock reiterated the requirement of a cross-border element in order for Union 
citizenship rights to be engaged,22 subsequent cases have expanded upon the interpretation of 
cross-border dimensions in order to find a cross-border element in situations that would 
ordinarily be regarded as internal. Thus the ECJ in Garcia Avello held that an issue involving 
the surname of children who possess dual MS nationality falls within the ambit of EU law, 
despite there being no exercise of fundamental rights.23 Further, where the spouse of a Union 
citizen moves from one MS to another which has the effect of affecting that Union citizen's 
tax requirements, the situation cannot be regarded as purely internal.24  
However the ECJ in Rottmann took expansion one step further by failing to regard the 
internal situation restriction, indicating a shift in the jurisprudence. One interpretation of this 
omission is the favouring of the disengagement with the internal situation restriction. This 
approach was upheld in Zambrano where the ECJ stated that "national measures which have 
the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred" are precluded by Article 20(1) TFEU.25 Similarly to Rottmann, no mention 
was given to the restriction on internal situations, despite the applicant being a third-country 
national who was relying solely on his children's rights as Union citizens. Further, the ECJ in 
McCarthy subsequently held that the failure of an applicant to exercise her right to freedom 
of movement is insufficient to regard the situation as purely internal as, based on Zambrano, 
the emphasis is on the deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights.26 
Thus, the case law post-Rottmann indicates a shift away from requiring a cross-border 
element and towards the effect that the measure has on the rights instead, though it has not 
removed the restriction in its entirety. 
The decoupling of internal situations from matters regarding citizenship has gained support in 
recent years from academics. In her Opinion to the Court in Zambrano, Advocate General 
Sharpston discussed the paradoxical effect that arises from the requirement to exercise 
fundamental rights in order to fall within the ambit of EU law.27 Should the law require an 
                                                            
22 Metock  at para 77. 
23 Garcia Avello, above n 12, at para 45. 
24 Case C-403/03 Schemmpp v Finanzamt München [2005] ECR I-6421 at paras 22-25. 
25 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de I'Emploi [2011] ECR I-1177 at para 42. 
26 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000 at paras 46-47. Note, as the national measure 
in no way had the effect of depriving Mrs McCarthy of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights nor 
affected her ability to exercise her rights of free movement, her application failed.  
27 Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano, above n 25, at para 84. 
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individual to move in order for EU law to be engaged, this puts them in a better position than 
a person who has not exercised their right to freedom of movement - even though their 
situations may otherwise be identical.28 This results in reverse discrimination towards the 
national who has chosen not to exercise their rights,29 and thus "lottery rather than logic"30 
would seem to dictate the result.  
Although her Opinion was given in the context of the "right to reside" being independent 
from the "right to move",31 Advocate General Sharpston's argument in its broader application 
favours the removal of an internal situation restriction. Should freedom of movement be 
divided into two independent rights, as advocated for by Sharpston, then a cross-border 
element need not be necessary in order for EU law to be engaged. The focus would be the 
negative effect on the rights rather than the exercise of fundamental rights. Acquisition of 
nationality would therefore not be barred from falling within the scope of EU law simply 
because it may be considered an internal situation. Although the ECJ in its judgment in 
Zambrano did not elaborate on the points discussed by Sharpston, in holding that the 
emphasis is on the enjoyment of rights while failing to mention internal situations the Court 
implicitly accepted that there need not be an exercise of the freedom of movement for the 
situation to fall within the scope of EU law, thus confirming Sharpston's Opinion. 
This illogical effect of reverse discrimination was reiterated by Advocate General Kokott in 
her Opinion to the Court in McCarthy.32 Kokott noted that while the current law does require 
an exercise of rights, it cannot be ruled out that this could be subject to review should an 
occasion to review it arise as Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of all 
nationals.33 Taking a less conservative approach, the ECJ in that case held that the fact that 
there had been no exercise of the freedom of movement could not, by that reason alone, 
constitute a purely internal situation.34 Rather, EU law cannot be engaged where there has 
been no exercise of fundamental rights provided that the situation does not include the 
application of measures which would have the effect of depriving the person of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights.35 Where there has been a negative effect on the 
                                                            
28 At para 84. 
29 At para 133. 
30 At para 88. 
31 At para 80. 
32 Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, McCarthy, above n 26, at paras 42 and 46. 
33 At paras 42 and 46. 
34 McCarthy above n 26, at para 46. 
35 At para 56. 
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enjoyment of the rights, the fact that it would ordinarily be an internal situation does not 
preclude the application of EU law. It is important to note that the applicant in that case had 
not exercised her right to freedom of movement, nor did the measure affect her enjoyment of 
the substance of the rights, therefore the case was not affirmed on the law enunciated by the 
Court. 
The significance of both Opinions cannot be denied in the face of Directive 2004/38/EC 
which provides that "Union citizenship should be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States when they exercise their right of free movement and residence".36 As 
explicitly stated, in order for EU law to be engaged there must be an exercise of the right to 
freedom of movement. Despite this, both Advocate-Generals advocate for the review of this 
requirement on the grounds of reverse discrimination and the intention for Union citizenship 
to be the fundamental status of all nationals. Furthermore, the path taken by the ECJ shows a 
clear intent to focus on the effect on rights rather than the exercise of rights. This 
inconsistency with EU secondary law indicates a significant shift in the jurisprudence, 
resulting in the diminished effect of the restriction posed by internal situations. 
B A Conservative Approach: Measures that "Affect" the Rights Conferred 
As outlined in the above discussion, following Rottmann there has been a shift in the 
jurisprudence to focus on the effect that a measure has on the rights conferred and protected 
by the EU, in particular the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights. The difficulty 
with this approach is that a strict interpretation of Rottmann and Zambrano confines their 
application to measures aimed at affecting or depriving the national of their pre-existing EU 
rights.37 Even if one accepts the argument favouring the removal of the internal situation 
restriction, the acquisition of nationality would not fall within the ambit of EU law as 
applicants have no pre-existing EU rights that can be affected by a measure imposed by the 
MS. EU law would only be invoked once an individual has become a Union citizen by dint of 
acquiring MS nationality.38  
                                                            
36 Directive 2004/38/EC (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States) 
([2004] OJ L158/77, at para 3) 
37 See Rottmann, above n 8, at para 48. Note, the ECJ refers to the proviso to have due regard to EU law "in 
respect of citizens of the Union"; Ruiz Zambrano, above n 25, at para 42. Note, the ECJ refers to measures that 
have the effect of depriving "citizens of the Union" of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred. 
38 Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano, above n 25, at para 105. 
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However, both Rottmann and Zambrano dealt exclusively with the deprivation of pre-existing 
rights. In neither case was the acquisition of nationality explicitly discussed. It could be 
argued that statements made referring to Union citizens and their pre-existing rights were 
made due to the context of the cases. Furthermore, Advocate-General Maduro in his Opinion 
in Rottmann makes specific reference to the compatibility of conditions with EU law for both 
the acquisition and loss of nationality,39 yet the ECJ makes none. This provides further 
indication that the ECJ determined the case solely by reference to the specific issue at hand 
and did not intend to restrict its application to measures depriving citizenship as there was no 
need to discuss broader issues. 
In support of a broader interpretation of Rottmann, the one statement made with indirect 
reference to acquisition was made in the context of reacquisition and how the principles 
enunciated apply both to the MS withdrawing nationality and to the MS of original 
nationality.40 This implies that should an ex-national reapply for citizenship the original State 
of nationality must have due regard to EU law.41 Based on the reasoning in that case this 
could be interpreted to mean that the ECJ considers measures imposed on the reacquisition of 
nationality could affect the enjoyment of the substance of the rights, despite the applicant no 
longer being entitled to those rights. 
A further hurdle is the decision in Kaur which was distinguished on its facts in Rottmann,42 
as the applicant in that case had no pre-existing EU rights to be deprived of, therefore her 
situation did not fall within the scope of EU law.43 The clear implication is that it is only the 
deprivation of citizenship that falls within EU law. However Kaur can be distinguished here, 
again based on its facts. The applicant obtained British nationality as a British Overseas 
Citizen. This status did not confer on her any immigration rights or the right to abode in the 
United Kingdom, and thus it did not confer on her Union citizenship. The ECJ upheld her 
status as a non-EU citizen based upon the  right of the UK to choose which nationals shall 
also be considered Union citizens.44 The issue in that case was not whether acquisition fell 
within the scope of EU law but whether her particular category of nationality precluded her 
                                                            
39 Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro, Rottmann, above n 8, at paras 23 and 26. 
40 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 62. 
41 Jo Shaw, Setting the scene: The Rottmann case introduced (European University Institute: Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, EUI Working Papers 2011/62, December 2011) 
at 4. 
42 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 49. 
43 Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237, at para 25. 
44 At para 27. 
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from benefiting from Union citizenship. The distinction between that case and the issue at 
hand is that her already acquired nationality was never intended to give her Union citizenship 
thus she could never be deprived of any rights, whereas the question in this paper examines 
whether the refusal to grant MS nationality and consequently Union citizenship can be 
considered as affecting the enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred and protected 
by Union citizenship. 
Undeniably, the deprivation of Union citizenship affects an individual's ability to enjoy the 
substance of the rights conferred by that status. The question becomes, can a distinction 
reasonably be drawn between the deprivation of EU rights and the granting of it (or the 
failure to grant it)? Logic would dictate no. The exclusion from Union citizenship impacts 
just as much on the ability to genuinely enjoy the rights as does the deprivation of Union 
citizenship.45 As argued by Davies, a measure which hinders free movement cannot be 
defended on the grounds that it prevents an individual from engaging in cross-border 
activities and therefore EU law does not apply.46 Why then should it not follow that a 
measure which prevents the acquisition of Union citizenship and the rights conferred by that 
status also cannot be defended? The prevention of acquisition of nationality obstructs the 
"right to have rights" just as much as a measure hindering free-movement obstructs the right 
to exercise that right of free movement. If national measures which affect the rights conferred 
and protected are amenable to review by the ECJ, a refusal to grant nationality also falls 
within the scope of EU law as it affects the ability of the applicant to exercise and enjoy those 
rights.47 It would otherwise be absurd and illogical to have two different legal orders govern 
the deprivation and acquisition of the same legal status, as the two are so obviously 
connected.48 
Furthermore, while national measures which are liable to 'hamper' or 'render less attractive' 
the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms by Union citizens falls within the scope of 
EU law,49 the EU has traditionally been just as much concerned with measures which prevent 
                                                            
45 Gareth T. Davies The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights (EUI Working Papers 
2011/62), above n 41, at 8. 
46 Gareth T. Davies The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights (EUI Working Papers 
2011/62), above n 41, at 8. 
47 At 7. 
48 Dimitry Kochenov Two sovereign states vs a human being: CJEU as a guardian of arbitrariness in 
citizenship matters (EUI Working Papers 2011/62), above n 41, at 12. 
49 Case C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, at para 32. 
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the obtainment and exercise of fundamental rights.50 Thus, the Tampere European Council 
concluded in its 1999 Milestones that the freedom of movement is not the exclusive 
prerogative of citizens of the Union:51   
Its very existence acts as a draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy 
the freedom Union citizens take for granted. It would be in contradiction with 
Europe's traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead 
them justifiably to seek access to our territory. 
The Tampere European Council went on to discuss the objective of fair treatment towards 
third country nationals and the aim to grant those who reside legally within the MS with 
rights and obligations comparable to those of Union citizens:52 
The legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of 
Member States' nationals. A person, who has resided legally in a Member 
State for a period of time… should be granted in that Member State a set of 
uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens… 
The European Council endorses the objective that long-term legally resident 
third country nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of 
the Member State in which they are resident. 
There is no logical reason why the deprivation of nationality and the acquisition of nationality 
should be treated any different from each other. Both equally affect the ability to genuinely 
enjoy the substance of the rights conferred and protected by the EU. In particular, the 
endorsement of the Tampere European Council to offer nationality to long-term resident third 
country nationals indicates that these individuals have the right to have Union citizenship 
rights. Any denial of that right affects those individuals just as much as it affects an 
individual as in Mr Rottmann's situation who is deprived of those rights. 
 
 
 
                                                            
50 Gareth T. Davies The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights (EUI Working Papers 
2011/62), above n 41, at 8. 
51 Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions [EU: European Council] 
(16/10/1999 - Nr: 200/1/99) at 3, < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm> 
52 At 21. 
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C A Broader Approach: By Virtue of its Fundamental Nature 
A broader approach interprets "by reason of its nature and consequences" to mean that the 
fundamental nature of the rights attached to citizenship is enough to bring the concept in its 
entirety within the ambit of EU law.53 This means, in practice, that any decision regarding 
either the conferral or deprivation of nationality taken by a MS that affects the status of 
citizenship of an individual falls within the scope of EU law.54 As Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of all nationals, such an approach would give the ECJ 
the ability to ensure that the rights provided by the EU are given proper effect. 
This approach is controversial as it calls for the effective removal of MS competence in 
matters regarding nationality. While each MS would still get to determine who its citizens 
shall be, they must only do so having due regard to EU law. National laws would be directed 
by EU law, so it cannot be said that the MS retains substantive competence under this 
approach. 
The controversial nature of this approach was noted by the court of second instance, the 
Bayerischer Verwaltungsgericthshof, in its judgment against Mr Rottmann. The Court noted 
that in the situation of a decision to withdraw nationality resulting in a person becoming 
stateless, for the proviso formulated in Micheletti to be observed the importance of the rights 
conferred through Union citizenship must be taken into consideration.55 Should there be an 
obligation to refrain from withdrawing naturalisation, on the basis that the importance of 
those rights take precedence, the effect would be to strike at the heart of the sovereign power 
of the MS to determine matters regarding nationality.56 While the result in Rottmann did not 
impose an obligation to refrain from withdrawing nationality, the requirement to have due 
regard to EU law poses a substantive restriction on the sovereign right of the MS to determine 
its nationals, thus nevertheless striking at the heart of its powers. 
The shift in the jurisprudence represents a recognition that matters of citizenship and 
nationality are no longer within the exclusive prerogative of each MS. If Union citizenship is 
destined to the fundamental status then by virtue of status all citizenship matters fall within 
the scope ratione materiae of EU law. However, this approach encroaches too far on state 
                                                            
53 Oxana Golynka The correlation between the status of Union citizenship, the rights attached to it and 
nationality in Rottmann (EUI Working Papers 2011/62), above n 41, at 19. 
54 Dimitry Kochenov "Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported" (2010) 47 CMLR 1831 at 1842. 
55 Rottman, above n 8, at para 32. 
56 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 32. 
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sovereignty, into an area that was never intended to fall within the competence of EU law, as 
indicated by the Declaration on Nationality attached to the TEU. Furthermore, recent German 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decisions have upheld the approach taken by the FCC 
which allows it to review the acts of EU institutions to determine whether they are ultra vires 
their sovereign power.57 Should the act be ultra-vires the FCC may refuse to apply them.58 A 
decision to draw all citizenship matter within the competence of EU law would very likely be 
considered ultra-vires the power of the ECJ, resulting in a conflict of laws. Therefore while 
this approach has merit, it cannot be the intended interpretation of the principles enunciated 
in Rottmann. 
IV  The Principle of Proportionality - A Restriction on the Acquisition of 
 Nationality? 
The fact that acquisition could fall within the ambit of EU law does not mean the removal of 
MS competence to determine matters regarding nationality. To the extent that the conditions 
on nationality imposed by the MS are consistent with EU law, the MS shall retain full 
competence. However, where the conditions may be inconsistent with EU law they will be 
amenable to judicial review by the national courts of the MS concerned.59 This will require an 
analysis of general principles of EU law and fundamental rights to determine whether the 
measures imposed are compatible with them or not.60 
The power of the ECJ to determine whether a measure concerning nationality falls within the 
scope of EU law and is thus amenable to judicial review by the national courts has been 
exercised and upheld when a measure restricts or deprives an individual of the benefit of EU 
rights, as was the case in both Rottmann and Zambrano. What is unclear is whether that 
power can apply and be upheld in regards to a measure which may result in harm to a group 
of individuals while conferring a benefit to an individual. In other words, can a measure 
which too readily grants nationality be subject to judicial review on the basis that it may 
result in harm to the EU, another MS or the rights of existing Union citizens? Once an 
individual is a citizen of one MS they are a citizen of all MSs by dint of their Union 
citizenship, so it is necessary to ensure that the granting of citizenship will not unjustifiably 
                                                            
57 BVerfGE 123, 267 [2010] 3 CMLR 13 [Lisbon] paras 240-241. 
<http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> 
58 At 241. 
59 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 55. 
60 Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro, Rottmann, above n 8, at para 28. 
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cause harm to the other MSs. Furthermore, the aim of the EU is to promote peace, its values 
and the well-being of its peoples.61 To this end, it would seem desirable to regulate the 
conditions for acquisition to ensure that the rights of pre-existing Union citizens and the 
attainment of EU values are not unjustifiably harmed. 
A Regulation: A Justified Restriction on Member State Competence? 
It is one thing for a measure restricting the acquisition of nationality to be held incompatible 
with EU law. It is quite another for a measure which too readily confers nationality to be held 
incompatible. Both strike at the heart of the sovereign right of the MS to choose their own 
citizens, though the latter may be seen as more antagonistic as it requires a MS to refrain 
from doing something that they have the legal right to do. However, where the decision shall 
affect an entire body of people, there is the need for a balance to be struck in order to ensure 
that the measures are proportional to the harm that may ensue. 
While MSs consistently assert their exclusive right to determine nationality matters, support 
for some form of regulation has increased in recent years by way of political backlash. Thus 
the decision of Spain62 to regularise almost 700,000 illegal immigrants in 2005 was highly 
criticised by certain MSs as there was genuine concern that the decision could provide an 
incentive for further illegal immigration to Europe or it could have potential spill-over effects 
into neighbouring countries.63 It is important to note that backlash to this decision occurred 
despite the fact that the regularisation did not confer any entitlement to nationality or 
residence and therefore no legal right to move freely across any border into another MS. On 
this basis alone it is reasonable to infer that any measure which has the effect of mass 
naturalisation and therefore conferral of Union citizenship would be subject to extreme 
backlash, calling for the MS to have due regard to EU fundamental laws. 
The establishment by Malta of its Individual Investor Programme (IIP) in 2013 elicited such a 
response. The IIP proposes to grant Maltese nationality to individuals who contribute to the 
economic development of Malta.64 The programme has received considerable backlash, most 
                                                            
61 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] above n 2, Art 3(1).  
62 Joaquín Arango and Maia Jachimowicz. "Regularizing immigrants in Spain: a new approach." Migration 
Information Source 1.9 (2005): 2005, at 2-3. 
63 Dan Nowicki "Spain has granted amnesty, but not without controversy" The Arizona Republic 
<http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/global-immigration-spain-amnesty.html> Accessed 16/05-14 
64 Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2013 (MAL), Art 3. 
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notably from the European Commission.65 While it is not uncommon for a MS to implement 
such a programme,66 the controversial element is the omission of any requirement of prior or 
subsequent residence.67 Any individual who has the financial means could purchase Union 
citizenship without any link to Europe. Under political pressure and the threat of a request to 
the ECJ to provide a preliminary hearing on the matter,68 Malta agreed to engage in 
discussions with the European Commission. As a result, Malta agreed to require proof of 
Maltese residence for a term of at least 12 months before nationality would be granted.69 
The failure of Malta to implement a residence requirement raises genuine concerns about the 
affect the IIP would have had on fundamental objectives of the EU, the rights of Union 
citizens and the interests of other MSs, had it not been amended. As it was not referred to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling the remainder of this paper shall examine the potential harm 
arising from the IIP in its original form and whether that harm is disproportionate to the 
benefit that is conferred on the individual applicant. 
B  Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality is defined in Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union:70 
Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
Rottmann makes it clear that the principle also applies to an act of the MS.71 Further, as noted 
above, it is for the national court to ascertain whether the act or measure observes the 
principle "so far as concerns the consequences it entails for the situation of the person 
concerned in the light of European Union law".72  
                                                            
65 Andrew Rettman "EU Commission prepares legal challenge on Malta passport sale" (23January 2014) 
EUobserver < http://euobserver.com/justice/122843>  
66 See eg: UK Tier 1 (Investor) visa < https://www.gov.uk/tier-1-investor>; see §10(6) 
Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz, BGB1. 311/ 1985 (available in German only), see summary of Austrian citizenship-
by-investment in English <http://www.globalcitizen.ru/en/ur/Austria/> 
67 Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2013, above n 63. 
68 Andrew Rettman "EU Commission prepares legal challenge on Malta passport sale", above n 64. 
69 European Commission "Joint Press Statement by the European Commission and the Maltese Authorities on 
Malta's Individual Investor Programme (IIP)" (press release, 29 January 2014). 
70 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, above n 2, Art 5. 
71 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 55. 
72 At para 55. 
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The test for proportionality as applies to actions of a MS requires two steps: 73 First, the 
national rule must be objectively necessary in order to help achieve the aim sought by the rule 
and, secondly, the restrictions caused by the rule must not be disproportionate to the aim 
sought by the rule.  
The first requirement is often straight-forward to satisfy. The objective of the IIP is the 
enhancement of economic development in Malta. An investor is conferred Maltese 
nationality and Union citizenship in order to give them an incentive to invest in Malta. Malta 
is a small country and is largely economically dependent on foreign trade, tourism and 
imports.74 Without the conferral of nationality there may be little incentive to invest. On this 
basis, the IIP is necessary in order to achieve the objective of economic growth. 
The second requirement is much more difficult to determine. While the focus is ordinarily on 
the restrictions imposed by the measure, here the focus is on the lack of restrictions and 
whether the failure to impose restrictions is proportionate to the potential harm that could be 
done. 
1 "An ever closer union among the people of Europe" 
The ultimate aim of EU integration is to create "an ever closer union among the people of 
Europe".75 The reference to "people of Europe" could be interpreted to imply an aim to create 
a 'European' identity, which a Union citizen has a right to achieving by dint of their bond to 
the MS. In this respect, the existence of a bond with the state of nationality is crucial to 
establishing a higher European identity and thus fulfilling the aim of European integration.  
Nationality has been recognised as "a legal bond, having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the 
existence of reciprocal rights and duties".76 The characteristic feature of that relationship is 
the existence of a bond of allegiance to the State. As such, it has been suggested by critics 
that this relationship between the state and the national cannot be transposed to the 
                                                            
73 Opinion of Advocate-General Van Gerven, Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 
Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan et al [1991] ECR I-4685, at para 27. 
74 Malta.com "Economy of Malta: Strong points, and development of Maltese business and trade"  
<http://www.malta.com/en/about-malta/economy> Accessed 04/06-14; see also European Commission 
"Economic and Financial Affairs: Malta - Robust growth outlook" (European Economy 3|2014, 05 May 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2014_spring/mt_en.pdf> 
75 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, above n 2, Art 1. 
76 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) Judgment of April 6 1995, I.C.J Reports 1955, 4 at 23. 
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transnational level.77 This is because the transnational level does not establish the same 
complex rights independent of the state and it does not generate a sense of emotional 
connection.78 While a bond to the state is important to establishing a national identity, it 
would be irrelevant to the determination of whether the aim of and right to a European 
identity is being fulfilled. However arguments that propound complexity at the transnational 
level, such as ineffective democratic representation and lack of one shared language, have 
just as much applicability at the national level,79 in particular in countries which embrace 
multi-culturalism. 
Along a similar vein, Advocate-General Maduro in his Opinion to the Court in Rottmann 
discussed the conceptual elements behind Union citizenship and how Union citizenship is the 
"product of a decoupling from nationality".80 While Union citizenship presupposes a political 
relationship, it is not a relationship of belonging to a people.81 It is founded upon the 
commitment to construct a new form of European political allegiance in a geographical area 
which does not consist of people of the same nationality.82 In this way, it ensures that the 
relationship with the MS is the primary allegiance while recognising that there can be a 
transnational citizenship which is not determined by nationality.83 
While Union citizenship may not require a sense of belonging or an identity to Europe in 
order to be obtained, it does not necessarily mean that a higher European identity is not an 
objective that ought to be achieved or ought to be aimed for. Political integration does not by 
itself lead to an ever closer union of people. As evidenced by the results of the recent 2014 
European Parliamentary Elections,84 it is the support of the people and their sense of 
belonging to Europe that will determine the continued existence and effectiveness of the EU. 
President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso in his statement on the outcome 
of the election recognised this when he said the following:85  
                                                            
77 M. Victoria Costa "Citizenship and The State" (2009) 4/6 Philos Compass 987 at 989. 
78 At 990. 
79 At 992. 
80 Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro, Rottmann, above n 8, at para 23. 
81 At para 23. 
82 At para 23. 
83 At para 23. 
84 BBC News Europe "Eurosceptic 'earthquake' rocks EU elections" (26 May 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714> 
85 European Commission "Statement of President Barroso on the outcome of the 2014 European Parliament 
Elections" (press release, 26 May 2014). 
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Standing together as Europeans is indispensable for Europe to shape a global order 
where we can defend our values and interests. This is the moment to come together 
and to define the Union's way forward. 
In further support, the ECJ in Rottmann held that it would not be contrary to EU law to 
deprive an individual of their Union citizenship where MS nationality had been obtained by 
deception.86 This is because it is legitimate for a MS to protect the relationship of solidarity 
and good faith which forms the bedrock of the bond of nationality - a bond which is 
undeniably broken by an act of deception.87 Therefore the bond with the state cannot be 
dismissed as being irrelevant to Union citizenship in the light of this decision. 
By failing to incorporate a requirement of residence prior to the granting of nationality, the 
IIP grants to an applicant MS nationality without a bond ever being established between the 
applicant and the MS. This frustrates the aim of an ever closer union of the people of Europe, 
as the lack of a bond to the MS impedes the creation of a higher European identity. The 
failure to form a bond results in a body of people who have no identity to a European state 
and therefore no identity to Europe. There is no sense of belonging and no will to attain the 
objective of a closer union of European people.  Failure to require residence in order to 
establish a bond with the MS not only frustrates the fundamental aim of the EU but it also 
affects the right of the Union citizen to obtain this European identity which they are destined 
to have through their fundamental status as citizens of the EU. 
2 The Rule of Law and anti-discrimination 
Malta's IIP programme discriminates against those who cannot afford to buy citizenship, 
however there is nothing to say that countries cannot discriminate based on financial wealth. 
The accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), of which 
the draft accession agreement has been finalised,88 will require the EU to comply with the 
ECHR in ensuring that rights are protected and upheld, however the ECHR also fails to 
mention discrimination based on financial wealth.89 While the prohibition on discrimination 
                                                            
86 Rottmann, above n 8, at para 59. 
87 At para 51. 
88 Council of Europe "Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights" Human 
Rights and Rule of Law <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> 
89 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html> Note: Art 14 Prohibition on Discrimination: The enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
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enshrined in Art 14 of the ECHR extends beyond the rights contained within the ECHR, the 
State must provide the additional rights for which the prohibition shall extend to.90 As 
investment programmes are desirable contributors to the economic growth of the State, it 
would be contrary to both logic and public policy for a State to prohibit discrimination based 
on financial wealth. 
Nevertheless, the EU is founded on a number of values including the Rule of Law, where 
individuals have a right to be treated equally under the law.91 Any rules surrounding 
nationality must not unjustifiably treat applicants differently. The effect of the absence of a 
residence requirement is the creation of an elite category of citizenship, where those who 
have the financial means to buy their nationality are treated most favourably compared to all 
other applicants. To demonstrate, the average applicant must be resident in Malta for a term 
of at least 5 out of the 7 years preceding the application for nationality, whereas the IIP in its 
original form required no residence whatsoever. 92 This is inconsistent with the Rule of Law 
as it unjustifiably treats some individuals as 'more equal than others' and gives much more 
favourable treatment to those who can buy their way in. 
3 Right to security - the prevention and combating of crime 
A further objective of the EU is to ensure an area of security, where appropriate measures are 
implemented with the aim of preventing and combating crime.93 The main concern raised by 
the European Commission was that each MS would be put at risk should due diligence fail to 
ensure criminals are kept out of Malta's IIP.94 As the applicants would gain access to all EU 
countries it is reasonable for each MS to want to ensure criminals do not gain access, in order 
to minimise any potential harm. 
Directive 2004/38 permits MSs to restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Union 
citizens on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.95 While criminality 
is a ground for public policy, a criminal conviction is not of itself sufficient to justify a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with 
a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
90 Genovese v. Malta, Application no. 53124/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 11 
October 2011, at pra 32. 
91 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, above n 2, Art 2. 
92 Maltese Citizenship Act 1964 (MAL), Art 10(1)(a)(b); Subsidiary Legislation 188.03 Individual Investor 
Programme of the Republic of Malta Regulations 2014, Art 7(12). 
93 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, above n 2, Art 3(2). 
94 Andrew Rettman "EU Commission prepares legal challenge on Malta passport sale", above n 64. 
95 Directive 2004/38/EC, above n 36, Art 27(1). 
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restriction on free movement.96 In order to fall within the grounds of public policy there must 
be a "genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental 
interests".97 Furthermore, the measure taken must be based exclusively on the personal 
conduct of the person concerned.98 
There is no legitimate reason why Malta shall fail to exercise due diligence in ensuring 
criminals do not gain access to the EU, as the failure to require prior residence has no link to 
the good character requirements contained in the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2007 
which must be satisfied.99 Furthermore, the ability of the MS to restrict the freedom of 
movement under Directive 2004/38  on the grounds of public policy contributes significantly 
towards satisfying the objective of preventing and combating crime. Although the threshold 
for imposing a restriction is high, this ensures that the restriction on the fundamental right to 
freedom of movement is proportionate to the harm. The fact that criminals may not be 
adequately weeded out by the IIP falls far short of being sufficient enough to impose a 
restriction, especially where any restriction would be general, therefore there is no 
inconsistency with this objective. 
4 Considering the competing interests 
The failure to implement a residence requirement in the IIP results in a negative effect on the 
attainment of EU objectives and on the rights conferred to Union citizens. Nevertheless, the 
competing interests must be weighed, having regard to all the circumstances, to determine 
whether a fair balance has been struck between those interests.100  
As the IIP is based on financial wealth, the applicants could not possibly pose an 
"unreasonable burden" on public finances. The argument being that where the Union citizen 
shall become an unreasonable burden on the finances of the MS, the MS can subordinate their 
right to residence on the grounds of legitimate state interests.101 Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that the unjustified discrimination due to financial wealth is inconsistent with the 
                                                            
96 Case C-430/10 Gaydarov v Direktor na Glavna direktsia ‘Ohranitelna politsia’ pri Ministerstvo na 
vatreshnite raboti (17 November 2011), at para 34.  
97 At para 33. 
98 Directive 2004/38/EC, above n 36, Art 27(2). 
99 Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2007 (Cap. 188), Art 10(1)(d). 
100 Wolf Sauter Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? (Tilburg Law and Economics Centre, Discussion 
Paper No. 2013-003, January 2013) at 10, citing Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte 
und Planzüge v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659. 
101 Case 413/99 Bambaust v R [2002] ECR I-7091 at para 90. 
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fundamental principle of the Rule of Law. The inability of the applicant to pose an 
unreasonable burden on the finances of the MS is not enough to outweigh this inconsistency. 
It is understandably a matter of public policy for the MS to take measures to enhance its 
economic development. In fact, it would be contrary to EU law for a MS to not undertake 
measures aimed at promoting balanced economic growth, as they have committed to work for 
the sustainable development of Europe through economic means.102 However, there are 
alternatives that can be applied so as not to result in the effects discussed above. The 
imposition of a short-term residence requirement would greatly reduce the negative effects 
while arguably not substantially affecting the objectives sought by Malta. It can in fact be 
argued that it would be beneficial for Malta to impose a residence requirement as it would 
ensure the applicant first establish a bond with the state, rather than acquiring nationality and 
having no genuine connection which would stop them from moving to another part of the EU.  
5 Conclusion 
Based on the above, the failure of Malta to implement a residence requirement into the IIP 
results in disproportionate harm to the attainment of the objectives of the EU and to the rights 
of Union citizens. However, that does not mean that the IIP is incompatible with fundamental 
EU law. The concern is to ensure that Malta's IIP remains lucrative to those who are looking 
to invest. A short-term residence requirement would still fulfil the desired objective of 
enhancing economic development at the same time as ensuring that the rights of Union 
citizens are not unjustifiably affected by the granting of nationality to individuals who have 
no link to Europe. 
IV  Conclusion 
The ECJ has persistently encroached on an area which was intended to remain within the 
exclusive prerogative of the MSs, in what can only be seen as a bid to realise the full 
potential of Union citizenship as the fundamental status of nationals. As such, the ECJ has 
transformed the law on citizenship and has established mechanisms to protect Union citizens 
from arbitrary acts of the state in the field of nationality.  
While it is clear that acts aimed at depriving or affecting the rights conferred and protected by 
the EU fall within the scope ratione materiae of EU law, it remains to be seen whether the 
                                                            
102 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, above n 2, Art 3(3). 
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same applies for acts affecting the acquisition of nationality. A shift in the jurisprudence 
since Rottmann suggests that this is strongly open for debate and will likely form the basis of 
disputes in the near future.  
What is also clear is that any act that does fall within the scope of the EU must be compatible 
with EU law, in particular the principle of proportionality. As evidenced by Malta's 
Individual Investor Programme, the consequences of having to observe the principle of 
proportionality may result in the national rule being found incompatible with EU law. As 
national courts are the gatekeepers of proportionality, it shall be interesting to see whether the 
judicial outcomes favour the preservation of national sovereignty or the further integration of 
Europe, thus bringing Europe closer to a union of peoples. 
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